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(1984).
INTRODUCTION
One day, Mr. Jones walks into your office and tells you that he
wants to help junior start his own business, but he does not want
to incur any gift tax. "No problem," you say, and you proceed to
tell him about the advantages of an interest-free demand loan to
junior. You tell him that based on Johnson v. United States' and
Crown v. Commissioner,2 an interest-free demand loan will not re-
sult in a taxable gift. So junior can get the money to start his new
business, Mr. Jones can transfer some of his wealth without ad-
verse gift tax consequences, and all is right with the world - well,
almost. On February 22, 1984, the United States Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Dickman v. Commissioner3. The Court
overruled the decisions in Johnson' and Crown5 and held that an
interest-free demand loan between family members does result in a
taxable gift. Sorry, Mr. Jones, but do not despair. If you make
yourself comfortable, we will take a look at the High Court's rea-
soning and the implications of the Dickman" decision.
THE CASE
Between 1971 and 1976, Paul and Esther Dickman loaned sub-
stantial sums of money to their son, Lyle. 7 Lyle gave interest-free
demand notes as evidence of all debts (except one which was a
loan made on "open account").8 Paul died in 1976, and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service audited his estate. The IRS determined that
the loans to Lyle constituted taxable gifts "to the extent of the
1. 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966)
2. 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
3. - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1086.
4. 254 F. Supp. 73.
5. 585 F.2d 234.
6. 104 S. Ct. 1086.
7. The balance of Paul's loans to Lyle varied from $144,715 to $342,915 over
the five year period under review; Esther loaned $226,130 to Lyle during the same
period. Id. at 1088.
8. Id.
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value for the use of the loaned funds."9
The Tax Court followed the earlier decisions in Johnson0 and
Crown" and held that the interest-free demand loans to Lyle were
not taxable gifts.' 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court decision.13 After a review
of the statutory language and history of the gift tax provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the Appellate Court concluded
that Congress intended the gift tax to have the broadest and most
comprehensive coverage possible.14 That court held that the mak-
ing of an interest-free demand loan constitutes a "transfer of prop-
erty by gift" within the meaning of I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1), and is sub-
ject to the gift tax.' 5
Petitioner Dickman argued that gift tax consequences should
not attach to interest-free demand loans because:
(1) there is no "transfer" of property when the loan is made; 6
(2) our system of taxation does not recognize the possibility
that money lent might have enhanced a person's taxable income or
taxable estate if it had never been lent, but had been invested
wisely; 17
(3) the Commissioner's rationale could be carried to extremes
and subject commonplace transactions (e.g. the loan of a cup of
sugar to a neighbor; loan of lunch money to a friend) to gift taxa-
tion;"'8 and
(4) the Commissioner's position represents a departure from
prior IRS practice. The Commissioner's new position would injure
those taxpayers who have relied on prior practice in planning their
transactions."'
The IRS took the position that an interest-free demand loan
9. Id.
10. 254 F. Supp. 73.
11. 585 F.2d 234.
12. 104 S. Ct. at 1089.
13. Id.
14. Dickman v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 812, 815 (11th Cir. 1982).
15. Id. at 819.
16. "Petitioners urge that the term 'transfer' connotes a discrete, affirmative
act whereby a person conveys something to another person, not a continuous se-
ries of minute failures to require return of something loaned." Brief for Petition-
ers 22. 104 S. Ct. at 1091 n.7.
17. Id. at 1092.
18. Id. at 1093.
19. The Court referred to this argument as the "taxpayer reliance" argu-
ment. Id. at 1093-94.
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consists of two transactions. The first transaction is "an arm's-
length loan from the lender to the borrower, on which the borower
pays the lender a fair rate of interest."20 The second transaction is
"a gift from the lender to the borrower in the amount of that inter-
est. ' 21 Therefore, the taxable gift that results from the loan equals
the value of receiving and using money without any obligation to
pay interest. According to the IRS, a gift tax should be computed
on the reasonable value of the use of the money lent.22
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit holding
that an interest-free demand loan is a "transfer of property"
within the meaning of § 2501(a)(1). 23 This holding overruled eigh-
teen years of favorable gift tax treatment for interest-free demand
loans by the courts. Too bad, Mr. Jones.
BACKGROUND
A quick review of statutory material shows that I.R.C. §
2501(a)(1) imposes a tax on the "transfer of property by gift" dur-
ing the year by an individual. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) also re-
flects the broad scope of the language used by the Code. 24 How-
ever, neither the Code nor the Treasury Regulations give a precise
definition of what constitutes a "transfer of property" for purposes
of the gift tax.
The first case to consider the broad scope of I.R.C. § 2501 in
the context of interest-free demand loans to family members was
Johnson v. United States.25 That case involved a fact situation
similar to that in Dickman.26 Kirk and Elizabeth Johnson made
substantial loans to their two children between 1959 and 1962.2" A
non-interest bearing note payable on demand represented part of
the outstanding balance due from each child; open accounts repre-
20. Id. at 1090 n.5.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1090.
23. Id. at 1094-95. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Code sections
are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and regulations thereunder.
24. "The gift tax also applies to gifts indirectly made. Thus, all transactions
whereby property or property rights or interests are gratuitously passed or con-
ferred upon another, regardless of the means or device employed, constitute gifts
subject to tax." Treas. Reg. § 2511-1(c).
25. 254 F. Supp. 73.
26. 104 S. Ct. 1086.
27. By May 31, 1962 the total loan outstanding to each child was $305,001
and $235,792. 254 F. Supp. at 76.
1984] 219
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sented the remaining balance. 8 Kirk and Elizabeth, however,
made each loan payable on demand without interest. 9 In June
1962, each child repaid his debt in full, and the only loan that re-
mained outstanding when Kirk died in late 1962 was a $30,000
loan to Kirk, Jr.30 The IRS argued that each year between 1955
and 1962, the Johnsons made a gift to their children of the value of
the use of the money." The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas noted the lack of judicial authority in
this area of taxation and held that the Johnsons did not make tax-
able gifts to their children. The court determined that the trans-
action did not defeat the purpose of the gift tax law (i.e. preven-
tion of estate tax avoidance) because the Johnson children repaid
most of the loans, and Kirk's estate included the value of the loan
still outstanding.3 The Court also noted that the children were not
under a statutory or contractual duty to pay interest, and the par-
ents were not under a statutory or contractual duty to collect in-
terest.3 4 In dictum, Judge Brewster said that Congress is in a bet-
ter position than the courts to consider a gift on interest-free
demand loans."'
The IRS officially announced its nonacquiescence to the John-
son 8 decision almost seven years later in Rev. Rul. 73-61.17 That
ruling also announced the IRS position regarding interest-free de-
mand loans. The IRS viewed the right to use money as an interest
in property, which is subject to the gift tax unless the donor re-
ceives full and adequate consideration in exchange for that right.38
The IRS said that the rate of interest determines the value of the
property right, and the amount of interest that represents ade-
quate consideration varies, depending on the circumstances of the
transaction. 9 Therefore, the IRS concluded that a non-interest
bearing demand loan results in the transfer of a property interest
28. Id. at 74.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 76.
31. The IRS computed the use value of the money at 3 percent per annum
on the average unpaid balance for that year. Id. at 73.
32. Id. at 77.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 254 F. Supp. 73.
37. 1973-1 C.B. 408.
38. Id. at 409.
39. Id.
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which is subject to the gift tax for the portion of the year in which
the loan is outstanding.40
The next case involving the taxability of interest-free demand
loans was Crown v. Commissioner.41 In that case, Areljay Com-
pany, a partnership owned by three brothers, loaned approxi-
mately $18 million to a series of trusts established for the benefit
of the children and relatives of the three brothers.42 Interest-free
demand notes represented a small portion of the loans, but a ma-
jority of the loans consisted of open accounts with no provision for
interest. 4" The IRS determined that the loans to the trusts consti-
tuted gifts by the partners."
In Crown, the IRS argued that an interest-free demand loan
bestows an economic benefit on the recipient and that this transfer
is inimical to the purpose of the gift tax - protecting the income
tax and estate tax.45 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted
that this argument is correct with respect to the income tax,46 but
rejected the argument with respect to the estate tax because the
lender's estate can demand repayment of the loan.4 7 Although the
IRS attempted to bring this type of transfer within the broad
sweep of I.R.C. § 2501, the court rejected the IRS position. The
court rejected the "unequal exchange" argument under I.R.C. §
2512(b) which says that the promise to repay a certain amount of
money on demand is less in "money's worth" than the amount
loaned.48 The court found that the IRS did not present evidence
supporting this proposition and that, realistically, the value of the
promise to repay is both unknown and unknowable at the time of
the exchange.49 Since the "unequal exchange" argument implicitly
40. Although the value of the right to use the money is not ascertainable at
the date of the exchange, the value of the use of the money during the calendar
quarter is determinable as of the last day of each quarter that the loan remains
outstanding. Id.
41. 585 F.2d. 234.
42. Id. at 235.
43. Id.
44. To calculate the amount of the gifts the IRS applied an interest rate of 6
percent per annum to the daily outstanding balance of the loans. Id.
45. Id.
46. Interest-free loans permit income splitting between taxpayers in a high
bracket and taxpayers in lower tax brackets. Id. at 236.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 238.
49. There is an incomplete transfer of the economic benefit at the time of
exchange because the transaction depends on the lender's continued willingness
1984]
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assumes that the values being compared will be measured at the
same point in time, the IRS could not use this theory to support a
gift tax on the loan.50
The court also rejected the IRS argument that an interest-free
demand loan is an outright transfer of a property right (i.e., the
right to use the money for an indefinite period). 1 There was no
evidence to show that the recipient of a loan payable on demand
had a legally enforceable interest against the lender, and there was
no evidence that the borrower's interest had an exchangeable
value.52 Finally, the court rejected the IRS position that a gift oc-
curred continuously throughout the life of the loan because the
mere right to use property is not a property right within the mean-
ing of the gift tax statutes.5 3
In addition to squarely rejecting the IRS position, the Seventh
Circuit court cited several problems with the judicial approval of
the IRS position. First, judicial approval would require the courts
to determine an appropriate rate of interest to impute to interest-
free loans. The absence of statutory guidance on this question
would make it difficult for taxpayers to know when a particular
loan gave rise to a taxable gift and the amount of the gift.54 The
court also cited the potential broad application of a judicial deci-
sion to everyday instances of family exchanges.5 5 Third, the court
felt that equitable considerations did not permit it to adopt the
IRS position. After all, the IRS did not appeal the Johnson56 deci-
sion and did not announce its nonacquiescence until seven years
later.57 These policy considerations moved the Seventh Circuit to
affirm the Tax Court decision and hold that interest-free demand
loans are not taxable gifts. 8 Thus, the Crown59 decision by the
Seventh Circuit set the stage for the conflict with the Eleventh
to refrain from demanding repayment. Id.
50. Id. at 239.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 240.
54. Id. at 240-41.
55. For example, the court reasoned that the IRS position might be used to
impute a gift when a worker lends another employee $10 until next payday or
when a friend provides a night's lodging to out-of-town guests at no charge. Id. at
241.
56. 254 F. Supp. 73.
57. 585 F.2d at 241.
58. Id.
59. 585 F.2d. 234.
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Circuit decision in Dickman" and led the Supreme Curt to con-
sider the problem of interest-free demand loans.
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court began its analysis in the Dickman case by
examining the gift tax statutes, specifically I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) and
I.R.C. § 2511(a). After reviewing the legislative history of these
statutes, the Court concluded that Congress intended the gift tax
to reach all transfers of property and property rights having signif-
icant value."
The Court next looked at the transfer of money to another
without any obligation to pay interest and found that the transfer
involved the right to use a substantial amount of cash for an indef-
inite period.2 Chief Justice Burger analogized the right to use cash
for an indefinite period to the right to use real property, rent-free,
for an indefinite period of time. He found that, in both cases, there
is a measurable economic value associated with the property trans-
ferred .6 Although the demand status of the loan reduced its value,
the value was not eliminated.64 Therefore, the Chief Justice con-
cluded, the interest-free transfer of funds is a "transfer of prop-
erty" within the meaning of the federal gift tax statutes.6 5
The Court then justified its holding by saying that the holding
is consistent with the purpose of the federal gift tax - protecting
the income tax and the estate tax. According to the Court, failure
to impose the gift tax in this case would seriously undermine this
60. 690 F.2d 812.
61. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) imposes a tax on all transfers of property by gift.
I.R.C. § 2511(a) says that the gift tax applies whether the transfer is in trust or
otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and no matter what type of prop-
erty the transfer involves. 104 S. Ct. at 1089.
62. Id. at 1090-91.
63. "In either case, there is a measurable economic value associated with the
use of the property transferred. The value of the use of money is found in what it
can produce; the measure of that value is interest - 'rent' for the use of the
funds." Id. at 1091.
64. Id. at 1091.
65. The Court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the transfer was not a
taxable gift. The taxpayer based this argument on language in Treas. Reg. §
25.2511-2(b)(1983), which requires the transferor to give up dominion and control
of the property to make a complete gift. Chief Justice Burger noted that the
transferee retains some dominion and control when the loan passes, but as time
goes by without recall, the transferor allows the transferee to use the principal
and the gift becomes complete. Id. at 1091, n.7.
1984] TAX LAW 223
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goal."
In the remainder of the opinion, the Court rejected the tax-
payer's main arguments. The taxpayer argued that the gift tax is a
tax on transfers and is not applicable to other acts of consumption;
a transferor may squander, conceal or use his money as he
pleases.6 The Court pointed out that its holding does not require
the transferor to invest his money profitably, but merely recognizes
that certain tax consequences result from a decision to make a
transfer by gift. 8 With respect to the taxpayers argument about
the extremes to which a judicial decision upholding the IRS posi-
tion might be carried, the Court assumed that the IRS focus was
not on traditional familial transfers, such as the use of a car or
cottage by a child. 9 Finally, the Court rejected the taxpayer's
"detrimental reliance" theory by pointing out that the IRS may
change its interpretation of the law, even though the change is ret-
roactive in effect.70
Justices Powell and Rehnquist dissented from the majority
and argued that the interest-free demand loan should not be sub-
ject to gift tax because of IRS inaction.7 1 In other words, the dis-
senters felt that judicial enforcement of the IRS argument would
be unfair to the many taxpayers who relied on the prior law con-
cerning interest-free loans.72
The majority opinion based part of the rationale for its hold-
ing on the broad language of I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) and I.R.C. §
2511(a). However, the language of these statutes seems less than
clear because interest-free demand loans have gone untaxed for so
many years. A more convincing reason for the majority decision is
66. How? The Court noted that the transfer of cash results in income tax
consequences to the lender. If a lender in a high tax bracket loans money to his
children in a lower bracket, he avoids tax on the income earned on the funds. He
also avoids future estate tax on the earnings which would have become part of his
estate. Id. at 1092.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Chief Justice Burger felt that the exemptions for educational and medi-
cal payments on another's behalf [I.R.C. § 2503(c)], the $10,000 annual exclusion
per donee [I.R.C. § 2503(b)], and credits, such as the mandatory use of the I.R.C.
§ 2505 unified credit, absorb the de minimus gifts. Id. at 1093.
70. The Court also noted that there could be no detrimental reliance by the
Dickmans because they made almost one-half of the loans after the IRS an-
nounced its official position in Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408. Id. at 1094 n.13.
71. Id. at 1096-97.
72. Id.
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the argument that a borrower receives economic value when a
lender allows him to use funds without any obligation to pay inter-
est. That economic value equals the amount of interest which the
loan permits the borrower to avoid. This approach recognizes the
economic reality of interest-free demand loans, at least between
family members. In other words, family members often loan money
to one another with no expectation of profit, hoping to help the
borrower avoid a loan from a commercial institution which does
expect a profit on a loan. The Court recognizes the economic basis
for the transaction and finally calls an interest-free demand loan
by its true name - a gift.
Clearly, the majority opinion represents a victory for the IRS
by holding that interest-free demand loans are subject to gift tax.
However, the Court failed to address several important areas.
(1) The Court offered no guidance on the proper interest rate
to use to value the property right that is subject to the gift tax. As
Justices Powell and Rehnquist point out, the IRS used three dif-
ferent methods in three different cases to determine the interest
rate.7"
(2) The Court did not address the income tax consequences of
an interest-free demand loan. The IRS position views an interest-
free demand loan as involving two separate transactions. The first
transaction is "an arm's-length loan from the lender to the bor-
rower, on which the borrower pays the lender a fair rate of inter-
est. '" 7 ' The second transaction is "a gift from the lender to the bor-
rower in the amount of that interest." 5 Theoretically, the lender is
subject to income tax on this imputed interest and the borrower
receives an interest deduction for the same amount.
(3) The Court did not limit its decision to interest-free de-
mand loans, but included other transactions involving the use of
property. 6 In effect, the question remains: What transfers or loans
73. In Johnson, the IRS used the interest rate specified in the regulations
for valuing annuities, life estates, terms for years, remainders and reversions; in
Crown, the IRS used a rate that it determined to be reasonable; in this case, the
IRS used the rate specified in I.R.C. § 6621 for determining interest on underpay-
ments or refunds of taxes. Id. at 1098 n.9.
74. Id. at 1090 n.5.
75. Id.
76. See Justice Powell's dissenting opinion, "Under this theory, potential tax
liability may arise in a wide range of situations involving the unrecompensed use
of property." He cites the rent-free use of a home by an adult child, and the loan
of a car as examples. Id. at 1097.
1984]
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are considered gifts?7 7 Chief Justice Burger's opinion neatly side-
stepped this issue when he said, "When the government levies a
gift tax on routine neighborly or familial gifts, there will be time
enough to deal with such a case. "78 Clearly, if a transfer of certain
property is a taxable gift, then a loan of that same property is also
a taxable gift under the Dickman decision.79
(4) Finally, the IRS can apply the Dickman decision retroac-
tively.80 That is, interest-free demand loans made prior to the
Dickman decision are also subject to the gift tax. If the donor has
not filed a gift tax return, the three year statute of limitations will
not have begun to run with respect to the particular gift. In such
case, the IRS might try to subject the transaction to the gift tax
and interest for each year that the loan has been outstanding.81
The annual exclusion will offset the effects of retroactive applica-
tion to some extent, but not if the loan is extremely large, or the
donor has already used the annual exclusion with respect to a par-
ticular donee.82
Although the Supreme Court did not address these areas, Con-
gress apparently took the hint from Justice Powell s" and addressed
most of them in the Tax Reform Act of 1984. The Act subjects the
foregone interest portion of interest-free demand loans to gift
tax.84 The Act also subjects the imputed interest portion of the
transaction to income tax.85 The interest element for interest-free
loans is determined by reference to the "applicable federal rate."'
77. Pearle, Supreme Court Finds Interest-Free Intrafamily Loans Are Tax-
able Gifts, But Valuation Left Open, 11 ESTATE PLAN. 130, 132 (1984).
78. Id. at 132 (quoting 104 S. Ct. at 1093).
79. Pearle, supra note 77, at 132. Presumably, this conclusion results be-
cause the loan transfers valuable property in the rent-free use of the property.
80. Id. at 134.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. "There can be little doubt that the courts are not the best forum for
consideration of the ramifications of the gift taxation of interest-free loans. Con-
gress is the body that is best equipped to determine the rules that should govern."
104 S. Ct. at 1097.
84. I.R.C. § 7872(e)(2) defines foregone interest as the difference between
the amount of interest payable using the applicable federal rate, and any interest
payable under the terms of the loan itself. Thus, if the loan is an interest-free
demand loan, the foregone interest is the interest payable using the applicable
federal rate.
85. This results because § 7872(a)(1)(B) treats the foregone interest as "re-
transferred by the borrower to the lender as interest."
86. § 7872(f)(2)(B) defines the applicable rate for demand loans as the "Fed-
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That rate will be redetermined every six months by comparing the
average market yield on outstanding federal obligations with com-
parable maturities.8 7 The Act provides some limitations in the fol-
lowing transactions:
(1) No income or gift tax consequences result if the aggregate
amount of the loan is not more than $10,000.88 However, this ex-
ception does not apply to any gift loan directly attributable to the
purchase or carrying of income producing assets.8 9
(2) No income tax consequences result to the lender or bor-
rower if the loan is $100,000 or less and the borrower's net invest-
ment income is not more than $1,000.90
(3) If the loan is not more than $100,000 and the borrower's
net investment income exceeds $1,000, interest is imputed, but
only to the extent of the borrower's net investment income. 1
The Act, on its face, does not directly address the question of
other transactions involving the use of property, but merely refers
to below-market loans, gift loans, and demand loans. The Confer-
ence Committee report says, "It is intended that the term 'loan' be
interpreted broadly in light of the purposes of the provision." '92
Additionally, the Committee report defines a gift loan as:
[A]ny below-market loan where the foregone interest is in the na-
ture of a gift. In general, there is a gift if property (including fore-
gone interest) is transferred for less than full and adequate con-
sideration under circumstances where the transfer is a gift for gift
tax purposes. 3
eral short-term rate in effect under § 1274(d) for the period for which the amount
of foregone interest is being determined."
87. Blattmachr, Estate and Gift Provisions of New Law May Require Revi-
sions of Estate Plans, 61 J. TAX'N 140, 143 (1984).
88. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2)(A). The taxpayer must take all loans, whether inter-
est-free or not, into account in making this determination. If the outstanding bal-
ance of a demand loan fluctuates above or below $10,000 during the year, there
may be income and gift tax consequences to the lender on some days, and no
consequences on others. Balk, Interest-Free No Longer, 123 TR. & Esr. 39, 40
(Sept. 1984).
89. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2)(B).
90. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(A) and § 7872(d)(1)(E)(ii). But note, this exception
does not apply if one of the principal purposes of the loan is the avoidance of any
federal tax. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(B).
91. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(A).
92. H. CON. R. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 1018, reprinted in 6B U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 751, 1012 (August 1984).
93. Id.
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Given this broad language and the potentially broad reach of the
Dickman decision, the IRS might argue that the rent-free use of
property is also subject to the federal gift and income taxes. How-
ever, Congress has given no indication under the Act as to how the
rent-free use of property must be valued."' Therefore, Congress,
like the Supreme Court in Dickman, does not expressly deal with
the taxability of transfers involving the use of property and leaves
the door open for additional confusion25
The Act applies to demand loans outstanding after June 6,
1984.96 If a borrower repays a demand loan within 60 days after
enactment of the Act (i.e., July 18, 1984), no income or gift tax
consequences result under the Act.9 7 Thus, the Act allows a lender
to avoid the imposition of any income tax if the borrower repays
his loan within the statutory time period. The Act, however, does
not address the retroactive application of Dickman to interest-free
demand loans outstanding prior to June 6, 1984. These loans re-
main subject to gift tax whether terminated within the statutory
period or not.9 8
PLANNING
What are the planning possibilities in light of the Dickman
decision and the Tax Reform Act of 1984? For loans existing prior
to June 6, 1984, the lender should terminate the demand loan as
soon as possible if the amount of the loan exceeds $100,000. Other-
wise, the lender will be subject to both income tax and gift tax on
the foregone interest since June 6, 1984. He will also be subject to
gift tax on the foregone interest prior to June 6, 1984 under
Dickman.
If the loan is less than $100,000, whether made before or after
June 6, 1984, the lender should continue the loan. Although the
loan is subject to gift tax under Dickman and under the new Act,
the $10,000 annual gift exclusion should make the transfer nearly,
if not completely, free of gift tax under the present applicable fed-
94. Congress would have to devise an "applicable federal rate" (e.g. fair
rental value) for different types of property to determine the amount of the gift
and the amount of income.
95. The I.R.S. might eliminate or clarify this area through regulations
promulgated under authority of I.R.C. § 7872(g). The result, however, would
probably not favor taxpayers.
96. Balk, supra note 88, at 40.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 42 n.11.
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eral rate.99 No income tax consequence result on a $100,000 loan if
the borrower's net investment income is less than $1,000. If the
borrower's net investment income exceeds $1,000, the loan is sub-
ject to income tax consequences, but only to the extent that net
investment income exceeds $1,000.100
A planner should also keep in mind two final points regarding
state law. State law may provide for a lower annual exclusion than
the federal exclusion under § 2503(b). Thus, an interest-free de-
mand loan which is not subject to the federal gift tax because of
the $10,000 annual exclusion, may be subject to gift tax under
state law.' 1 Also, the running of the state statute of limitations on
a demand note constitutes a transfer of property because the note
is no longer enforceable.0 2 The entire amount of the outstanding
loan then becomes subject to the gift tax.'13 A client who makes an
interest-free demand loan must, therefore, renew his loan from
time to time to avoid this result.'04
CONCLUSION
So what can you tell Mr. Jones when he walks into your office
and says he wants to loan junior some cash, interest-free? Tell him
that Dickman v. Commissioner'5 subjects the loan to federal gift
tax for the use of money without interest during the outstanding
period of the loan. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 sanctions the gift
tax treatment of the loan and also makes the loan subject to in-
99. The applicable federal rate for periods before January 1, 1985 is 10%,
compounded semiannually. See, Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
369, § 172, 98 Stat. 494, 703 (1984). Thus, the amount subject to gift tax on a
$100,000 loan is $10,250 computed as follows: $100,000 (1.05)2 = $110,250
$110,250 - 100,000 = $10,250
Assuming the lender has not used up the annual exclusion with respect to that
particular borrower, the amount actually subject to gift tax is $250 ($10,250 -
10,000).
100. Tax planners should make their clients aware that the favorable income
tax treatment of loans less than $100,000 can be lost if the IRS successfully claims
that the purpose of the loan was to avoid any federal tax. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(B).
See Balk, supra note 88, at 40-41.
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-188(d)(1984) now provides for a $10,000 annual
exclusion per donee.
102. Pearle, supra note 77, at 135.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 104 S. Ct. 1086 (1984).
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come tax. 08 However, the Act limits the effect of Dickman by ex-
cluding loans of not more than $10,000 from both gift and income
tax.107 The Act also allows loans of $100,000 or less to escape in-
come tax if the borrower's net investment income is not more than
$1,000.118 Therefore, Mr. Jones can loan junior $10,000 without in-
curring tax liability of any kind, or he can loan junior $100,000 and
this amount will not be subject to income tax. If he has not used
up his $10,000 annual exclusion, the $100,000 will also be free, or
nearly free, of gift tax. The bottom line is that the Supreme Court
and Congress, acting within six months of each other, have tight-
ened, but not closed off, an attractive tax loophole.
William T. Sharpe
106. By application of I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1).
107. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2)(A).
108. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(A) and I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(E)(ii).
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